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Abstract: This paper deals with the socio-political roles of 
jawara in Banten as both traditional and modern leaders 
during the New Order period 1966-1998. This paper shows 
that Banten is not only an area of piety, but also an area of 
tradition and violence in different forms. In the colonial 
period, jawara mounted resistance—along with ulama—
aimed at overthrowing not only existing political regimes 
but also the socio-cultural order as it then existed. During 
the New Order, this development was altered with the 
cooptation of both ulama and jawara by Golkar. By 
envolving to the state and adjusting to the new atmosphere 
of the political situation, jawara and ulama created new 
positions where they gradually expanded their power, status 
and wealth. Throughout the Suharto’s power, they 
demonstrated the patron-client relationships with the 
government.  
Keywords: Jawara, power relations, ulama, local politics. 
Introduction 
Banten is a religiously associated region, like Aceh and Madura, 
where the society is traditionally linked to a religious world view. It has 
many traditions and customs linked with religion. Banten is well-
known for its long history of mysticism and rebellion, as well as the 
Islamic orientation of its society. After Banten occupied by the Dutch, 
three forms of informal leadership emerged in Bantenese society. The 
first was the traditional aristocracy (priyayi). The others were ulama and 
                                                                 
1 Most parts of this paper are taken from my M.A. thesis at Leiden University, the 
Netherlands, while some parts are elaborated later. 
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jawara.2 Of these three, the latter two still exist until today, even they 
have the most important role in society, both during the colonial 
period and after Indonesian independence (the Old Order and the 
New Order, and Reform Era). 
Throughout history, jawara3 in Banten have displayed a long 
continuity in the various roles, from their mythical origins as 
bodyguards of kings and ulama, as instigators of rebellions, as 
criminals, as village heads, to their mobilisation as security personnel 
for political parties and the ruling elite. According to Sartono 
Kartodirdjo, the jawara consisted largely of people without permanent 
occupation who were often engaged in criminal activities.4 Resident 
F.G. Putman Craemer, in his memorie van overgave (memorandum of 
Dutch officials at the end of their term in office), wrote that jawara 
originally evolved from Orok Lanjang, a youth organization in the 
district of Menes. This organization then developed, spread outside 
Menes and became a bodyguard organization that was notorious for 
being involved in fighting and stirring up trouble (ANRI, 1980: 
XXIII).5 In fact, the colonial government considered jawara as bandits, 
                                                                 
2 In Indonesian society, the word ulama may be used arbitrarily to refer to kiai. In 
Banten, the term kiai also means leadership and other non-religious realms. In a 
broader context the term ulama refers to Islamic scholars and to Islamic religious 
leaders. Hence, this paper uses both terms, ulama and kiai, interchangeably. Moreover, 
in Indonesia, the term kiai and ulama can be used as both singular and plural forms. 
Other non-English terms in this paper can be used as both singular and plural forms as 
well. 
3 Jawara, in one way or another, have become the object of a number of studies. 
Sunatra (1997) wrote about the political positions of ulama and jawara. H.S. Suhaedi 
(2006) was concerned with the social mobility of jawara. Ahmad Abrori (2003) spoke 
about the political behaviour of jawara, while M.A. Tihami (1992) was concerned with 
the leadership of jawara in Banten. The notorious position jawara occupied in society 
was also dealt with by Atu Karomah (2004), who spoke about the culture of violence 
in Banten society. Furthermore, Syarif Hidayat (2003) dealt with Tuan Besar (literally 
Mr. Big), the autonomous hegemony of Tubagus Chasan Sochib and Okamoto 
Masaaki and Abdul Hamid (2008) were concerned with the power of jawara after the 
fall of Suharto. 
4 Sartono Kartodirdjo, The Peasants` Revolt of Banten in 1888, Its Conditions, Course, and 
Sequel: A Case Study of Social Movements in Indonesia (Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1966), pp. 57-58. 
5 Furthermore, Michael Williams stated that this organization was originally a mutual 
aid society which had its own administration, treasurer and local branches. Some 
branches had their own president and secretary with members paying monthly 
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so that all social oppositional movements against government were 
considered to be onlusten (disturbances), ongeregeldheden (revolts), complot 
(conspiracies), woelingen (disorders), or onrust (unrests).6 Both 
Kartodirdjo and Craemer classified jawara as a negative social group. 
This paper argues that the jawara have played a crucial role in the New 
Order Era as the main proponent of the regime in the local political 
culture. 
The paper is concerned with the roles of jawara in Banten during 
the New Order Era 1966-1998. It aims to elucidate the socio-political 
roles of jawara in the New Order Era. Regarding this, the study focuses 
on the following questions: what is the background of the emergence 
of jawara? What roles do jawara play in Banten in the New Order Era? 
How do jawara build the relationship with ulama and society?  
The Background to the Emergence of Jawara 
In general, Banten has two different geographical characteristics. 
The southern part is mainly upland and sparsely populated, while the 
northern part is more apt to be lowland and is densely populated. Most 
inhabitants in Banten are Sundanese, who reside in the southern part. 
Others are Javanese and Baduy or Kanekes. Javanese, who originally 
come from Demak and Cirebon, live mostly in the northern part. 
While Kanekes or Baduy7 people, develop their own culture and live in 
the mountain area in the southern part.8  
                                                                                                                                      
contributions. See, Michael Williams, Communism, Religion and Revolt in Banten (Athens: 
Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1990), p. 281. 
6 Nina Lubis, Banten dalam Lintasan Sejarah: Pergumulan antara Ulama dan Jawara (Jakarta: 
LP3ES, 2004), p. 128. 
7 For the position of Baduy people vis-a-vis the rest of the population of West Java, see 
Robert Wessing, “The Position of the Baduj in the Larger West Javanese Society,” 
Man, Vol. 12, No. 2 (1977): pp. 293-303. 
8 Kartodirdjo pointed out that the differences between North and South Banten 
should be ascribed partly to the differences in natural environment, an ecological 
factor, as well as to differences of a socio-cultural or historical nature. See, 
Kartodirdjo, The Peasants` Revolt of Banten, p. 30. Generally speaking, these three ethnic 
groups (the Sundanese, the Javanese, and the Baduy) have shown distinctions in 
language and custom. For instance, among the Dutch, the North Bantenese were 
notorious for their religious fanaticism, their aggressive attitude, and their rebellious 
spirit. Meanwhile, paying attention to the distinction in language, Moriyama Mikihiro 
argued that the self-awareness of being distinct in terms of language, culture, and 
ethnicity did not exist in West Java before the nineteenth century. It was colonial 
administrators and scholars who forced the people of West Java to objectify 
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The inland region of Banten is more fertile. The north, especially 
the coastal region, where the hills gradually slope downwards, is 
characterised by poorly irrigated rice fields, a relatively high incidence 
of crop failure, and the almost complete absence of any crop other 
than rice.9 However, Kartodirdjo has different opinion. According to 
him, the most irrigable rice field was in the mountain slopes and the 
plains in the north. Therefore, the domains of the Sultan located in the 
northern plain. Meanwhile, the mountainous and hilly regions in the 
south are regions where dry-rice are cultivated. Moreover, he points 
out that this region is dry and non-irrigable.10 It seems that the 
different perspective between these two authors concerning the 
fertility of Banten region lies on the changing appearance in Banten’s 
rice fields over time. It is also interesting to note that according to 
archaeologist, Heriyanti Untoro, there have been changes in the 
environment caused by the exploitation of clay for the making of 
earthenware vessels for hundreds of years.11 
Moreover, according to Kartodirdjo, social system in Bantenese 
society is determined by social stratification called undakan. There is a 
popular opinion that Bantenese society is usually conceived of as 
presenting a bi-modal class division. The majority of people comprises 
peasants, craftsmen, traders, and labourers are djalma leutik. The word 
orang tani is largely used for the social classification of people who 
made a livelihood by becoming tillers, craftsmen, and traders, while 
fishermen are not included. Meanwhile, a small upper class consists of 
bureaucratic elite and nobility called priyayi.12  
This categorization is somewhat incorrect since orang tani can also 
be considered as djalma leutik. Both of them are in a lower class 
compared to priyayi. Therefore, the division consisted of djalma leutik or 
                                                                                                                                      
themselves in opposition to the Javanese and the Malay, cited in Ota Atsushi, Changes 
of Regime and Social Dynamics in West Java: Society, State and the Outer World of Banten 1750-
1830 (Leiden and Boston: Brill., 2006), p. 174. 
9 Williams even suggested that Pandeglang in the South was the most fertile region in 
Banten. See, Williams, Communism, Religion and Revolt in Banten, pp. 2-4. 
10 Furthermore, he stated that economic factors favoured the North, which comprised 
the main granaries and was located to trade routes and centres. See, Kartodirdjo, The 
Peasants` Revolt of Banten, p. 31. 
11 Heriyanti O. Untoro, Kebesaran dan Tragedi Kota Banten (Jakarta: Yayasan Kota Kita, 
2006), p. 129. 
12 Kartodirdjo, The Peasants` Revolt of Banten, p. 50. 
  
Yanwar Pribadi 
JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 07, Number 02, December 2013 
318 
orang tani, and priyayi. Special attention must be paid to two prominent 
groups of the peasantry, the village authorities and the religious leaders, 
who formed the rural elite. Kartodirdjo suggests that social roles and 
attendant status within the village are clearly important. In the social 
movement, the religious leaders play an essential role, in which a 
special regard should be addressed to these leaders.13 
Kartodirdjo’s depiction of the rural elite is obviously important in 
providing background to the emergence of the jawara.14 During the 
sultanate period, the village head was appointed by the sultan or by the 
appanage holder, to which land in the village was granted as pecaton (land 
granted to relative’s officials, and personal favourites of the sultan). In 
one village usually there were several jaro (village head)15, each jaro 
represented his master, who had gotten land as pecaton. It is interesting 
to note that from the annexation of Banten up to 1844, the jaro seemed 
to have been appointed by the government on the basis of suggestions 
made by the village elders, or by the demang (district head in Banten and 
Batavia in the nineteenth century); as from 1844, the jaro were elected 
by the people and the choice afterwards sanctioned by the 
government. The main function of the jaro was a mediator between the 
local population and the broader administrative system. However, the 
jaro was regarded neither as a representative of the village inhabitants, 
nor as the real authority in their realm. The colonial government 
regarded the jaro as a weak link in the colonial administrative chain 
between the central government and the village.  
                                                                 
13 Ibid., p. 54. 
14 Williams and Atsushi have suggested that scholars who deal with the early 
nineteenth century Banten, especially the socio-economic and socio-political situation 
in that period, should consult Kartodirdjo`s work. Therefore, I am stimulated by these 
scholars in presenting the background to the emergence of jawara. Williams, 
Communism, Religion and Revolt in Banten, p. 3 and Atsushi, Changes of Regime, p. 10. 
15 In Colonial Java, the Dutch created new villages and gave the headmen power over 
villagers they previously did not have. Moreover, the Dutch named the village 
headmen ‘lurah’, a sacred position derived from the wayang (shadow puppet) tradition 
in Javanese popular culture. For historian Onghokham, the title of village headmen in 
pre-colonial Java seems not to have been lurah but bekel demang or petinggi patuh; they 
functioned chiefly as tax-collectors and organizers of labour. See, Onghokham, “The 
Jago in Colonial Java, Ambivalent Champion of the People,” in Andrew Turton and 
Shigeharu Tanabe (eds), History and Peasant Consciousness in South East Asia (Osaka: 
National Museum of Ethnology, 1984), p. 335. 
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Furthermore, Kartodirdjo suggests that there are at least four 
social groups which cut across the village hierarchy. The first is the 
kolot-kolot (the elders), who enjoy authority over the villagers, because 
they performed a ceremonial function in the village administration. 
The panghulu (head of mosque functionaries) or amil (village official in 
charge of collecting zakat), should be regarded as the second one. His 
power often surpassed that of the jaro. Last but not least, two more 
groups may be pointed out are the religious men and the jawara. The 
group of religious men (kiai and haji) are of high rank and should be 
regarded as socially prestigious in Banten, where almost everyone is a 
Muslim. The last group—the jawara—shall be discussed later.16 
Different with Kartodirdjo, Williams only points out three groups that 
dominate rural life in particular. They are the ulama, local notables, and 
the jawara.  
Kartodirdjo believes that the jawara consisted of people without 
permanent occupation, often engaged in criminal activities. Whereas 
Williams and Atsushi have a more positive view of them. Williams 
states that jawara are peasants, usually unattached young men, who led 
a semi-outlaw existence and whose influence and prestige are often far 
greater than official headmen. Atsushi sees jawara in almost the same 
way as Williams. According to him, jawara are not only local 
strongmen, whose influence and prestige are often far greater than 
those of the official headmen in remote areas of Banten throughout 
the colonial period, but he also associates jawara with the phenomenon 
of the social bandit throughout the world, in the nineteenth and the 
twentieth century, and with jago (local strongmen in colonial Java).17  
In principle, it can be argued that the emergence of jawara is not a 
result of sheer oppression and grinding poverty in Banten. Though 
they may have joined in spontaneous food riots, or may have 
committed criminal acts, people facing starvation are too busy merely 
surviving to plot the overthrowing of government or to formulate a 
blueprint for an alternative social order.18 The emergence of the jawara 
supports this proposition and the assertion that the potential for 
                                                                 
16 Kartodirdjo, The Peasants` Revolt of Banten, pp. 54-58. 
17 See, Ibid., pp. 57-58; Atsushi, Changes of Regime, p. 154; and Williams, Communism, 
Religion, p. 45. 
18 Eric Hobsbawn, Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the 19th 
and 20th Centuries (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1959), p. 79. 
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violent social protest corresponds to relative rather than absolute 
deprivation. Jawara groups who are considered to be bandits reduced 
to starvation or to total impoverishment; they suffered a significant 
decline in their social standing and economic well-being. 
In the colonial period, a considerable number of jawara started off 
as poor peasants who drifted back and forth between the countryside 
and the towns, or who had no land. Meanwhile, others were simply 
young men who depended on petty crime as an easier source of 
income than tilling the soil, or, in times of hardship, as a necessary 
addition to their income. They had an ambiguous relationship with the 
rural population; they were both feared and admired. Some exercised a 
virtual reign of terror in their regions, but others were seen as 
champions of peasant rights for their struggle against the Dutch and 
the priyayi.19 
Banten during the New Order 
According to Michael van Langenberg, the New Order is both 
state and state system. While the state is an entity, an arena, and an 
idea, while the state system is made up of executive government, 
military, police, parliament, bureaucracy and courts. Thus the state 
system can be perceived as a network of institutions, by means of 
which the rulers of a government attempt to control civil society and 
manipulate the means of production, distribution and exchange, in 
pursuance of declared national and community interests.20  
Moreover, Richard Robison suggests that the major indigenous 
business groups in the New Order Era could be divided into three 
categories: the survivors from the 1950s, the ‘politico-bureaucrats’ of 
the New Order who established business groups based largely on 
preferential access to government contracts and licences, and the ‘new 
capitalists’ who emerged over the 1970s and 1980s on the basis of their 
entrepreneurial abilities.21 Nevertheless, the most striking fact about 
these groups was that they were conglomerates controlled by members 
of the Suharto family. Many of the large Chinese-owned 
                                                                 
19 Williams, Communism, Religion, p. 46. 
20 Michael van Langenberg, “The New Order State: Language, Ideology, Hegemony,” 
in Arief Budiman (ed.), State and Civil Society in Indonesia (Clayton: Monash University 
Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, 1994), p. 122. 
21 Richard Robison, Indonesia: The Rise of Capital (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1986), p. 
329. 
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conglomerates of recent provenance were known to have strong links 
to high government officials and their immediate families. While the 
new breed of corporate tycoon which emerged under the New Order, 
whether Chinese or indigenous, still relied on family ties to secure their 
business.22 
In general, the situation as sketched above, holds true in any region 
in Indonesia, including in Banten. With the enactment of Law No. 
5/1974 on Government in the Regions, the New Order regime 
reduced Banten to one of several regencies under the Province of West 
Java. This brought with it many disadvantages. Until the reign of the 
New Order came to an end, Banten had the lowest levels of education 
and public welfare in West Java. Moreover, Banten had a high number 
of ‘backward villages’ as well.23 
Jawara as Politicians and Entrepreneurs 
Under the New Order the political domination of the state over 
society extended enormously. Suharto and his supporters, especially 
the armed forces, moved to limit political participation and to 
concentrate power. In a range of different ways the scope for societal 
groups to influence the content and direction of public policy was 
reduced as the government set about a massive restructuring of the 
country’s political landscape. Political parties and interest groups were 
tamed and brought within a central corporatist framework of state-
dominated political management. Moreover, as the New Order became 
more established, societal input was increasingly excluded, with control 
over policy coming to be monopolised by state officials. The 
government seemed to be able to rely on the armed forces to contain 
and suppress any unrest. The New Order then became a military-based 
regime with a developmental orientation that was characterised by a 
high level of state control over politics and policy.24  
In Banten, ulama and jawara were co-opted into the political 
machines of Golkar. The recognition of ulama by the governing party 
                                                                 
22 Anne Booth, The Indonesian Economy in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries: a History of 
Missed Opportunities (Canberra: The Australian National University, 1998), pp. 318-320. 
23 Syarif Hidayat, “‘Shadow State’?: Business and Politics in the Province of Banten,” 
in Henk Schulte Nordholt and Gerry van Klinken (eds), Renegotiating Boundaries: Local 
Politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2007), p. 206. 
24 Andrew Macintyre, Business and Politics in Indonesia (North Sydney, NSW: Allen and 
Unwin, Macintyre, 1991), pp. 2-3. 
  
Yanwar Pribadi 
JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 07, Number 02, December 2013 
322 
was manifested by the establishment of Satkar Ulama in 1971, while 
jawara were organised into Satkar Pendekar (the Martial Art Work 
Squad) in 1972. By involving to the state and adjusting to the new 
atmosphere of the political situation, they created new positions where 
they gradually expanded their power, status and wealth and developed 
patron-client relationships. 
The patron-client relationships in Banten in the New Order era 
perhaps were best identified in the ties between the state and jawara. 
Throughout history, jawara always work individually or in small bands. 
Whilst there were informal networks of individual jawara, usually based 
upon allegiances and loyalties to particular ulama, there had never been 
a formal structured organization. Satkar Pendekar, renamed Persatuan 
Pendekar Persilatan dan Seni Budaya Banten Indonesia (PPPSBBI-the 
Indonesian Association of Bantenese Men of Martial Arts, Art and 
Culture), was established as a forum for jawara and martial arts schools 
throughout Banten as well as those in Jakarta. From its inception 
PPPSBBI identified “nation and state” with Golkar, with whom they 
had had a close relationship since the 1977 general election. It was 
largely due to the influence of Tubagus Chasan Sochib who, since the 
early 1970s, was a local parliamentarian for the Golkar faction, and 
certainly a prominent figure in the jawara community.25 
Sochib was born in Serang in 1930 and died in Serang in 2011. He 
had three brothers, Tubagus Basuni, Tubagus Syatibi and Entus Sibli, 
and one sister, Ojah Faojah. They are all children of Tubagus Sochib 
and Nyi Ratu Rofiah. He attended several pesantren (Islamic boarding 
school) during his childhood. One of the pesantren, the Pesantren Pani`is 
in Jiput, Pandeglang was his first boarding school. He was entrusted to 
Kiai Cholil by his parents. During his stay, he showed braveness and 
intelligence, an attitude which would benefit his future career in many 
areas of society. In the revolutionary era, Sochib went to Pesantren 
Cadasari, under the guidance of Kiai Icot. Shortly after the acceptance 
to that pesantren, he joined Hisbullah, a guerrilla warfare unit, whose 
commanders were Kiai Abdullah and Ayip Samin. After the 
revolutionary period came to an end, he embarked upon a more 
serious working life in 1967 (after a couple of years dealing with a 
                                                                 
25 Ian Douglas Wilson, The Politics of Inner Power: The Practice of Pencak Silat in West Java 
(Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Murdoch University, 2003), pp. 257-258; Okamoto 
Masaaki, “Local Politics in Decentralised Indonesia: the Governor General of Banten 
Province,” IIAS Newsletter, No. 34 (2004), p. 23. 
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number of small businesses) by providing logistical support to the 
Kodam Siliwangi (the regional army forces of West Java). Two years 
later he founded a construction company, P.T. Sinar Ciomas Raya, 
which frequently won government tenders for road and market 
construction projects. His involvement spread to the Krakatau Steel 
State Company, and to tourism and real estate, while holding key 
positions in associations, such as the Regional and Central Chambers 
of Commerce and Trade (Kamar Dagang dan Industri - Kadin) and 
the Indonesian National Contractor’s Association (Gabungan 
Pengusaha Nasional Indonesia - Gapensi), putting his men on their 
local executive committees.26  
The position of Sochib in the PPPSBBI as chairman was the peak 
of his vertical mobility. That he was a kepala kuli (chief labourer) and 
then gained a more respectable status by becoming an entrepreneur 
showed this mobility. After he had reached the top, he moved 
horizontally, increasing his social mobility. Even though PPPSBBI is 
not a wing organization of Golkar, the organization was essential in the 
political context of Golkar. Golkar was a crucial and strategic element 
for Sochib in expanding his horizontal mobility. As a man with 
power—both social power and power through violence—through 
Golkar he had a wide sphere to increase his political access. To 
strengthen his domination in Golkar, he placed jawara as cadres in the 
organization with the banyan tree as its symbol. These cadres held 
several important positions at the district and municipal levels. 
Apparently, those who had had experience as local officials were 
favoured by him. However, according to H.S. Suhaedi, to be actively 
engaged in Golkar was not his choice in career, although in reality he 
was a member of the advisory board. For Sochib, Golkar was an 
instrument to expand and secure his business, not mainly a tool to 
obtain political power. Therefore, through Kadin and Gapensi, Sochib 
could control the companies operated in Banten, due to the fact that 
certifications from Kadin and Gapensi were necessary for government 
procurement. Sochib utilized this to coordinate projects in Banten and 
the coordination brought him more money. Another side to this 
situation is that it led jawara under his control to become his (sub) 
contractors and receive a share of his profits.27 
                                                                 
26 Ibid.; Khatib Mansur, Profil Haji Tubagus Chasan Sochib beserta Komentar 100 Tokoh 
Masyarakat Seputar Pendekar Banten (Jakarta: Pustaka Antara Utama, 2000), pp. 79-82.  
27 Masaaki, “Local Politics in Decentralised Indonesia”, p. 23. 
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Nevertheless, I would argue that the PPPSBBI is the first 
organization to spread his power in the political constellation, and that 
the political constellation was the vehicle introducing him to a bigger 
business world than he had moved in before. One of the main 
purposes of the establishment of the PPPSBBI was to channel the 
aspirations of jawara away from self-interest and criminality towards 
more ‘constructive’ activities, that contributed to the New Order`s 
programme of social and economic development. Encompassing over 
70 perguruan (martial art schools) and debus (traditional Bantenese 
invulnerability performance) groups, by the mid 1990s the organization 
claimed a membership of 170,000. In the words of Sochib, “in the past 
jawara only fought for themselves, their group or tribe, however via the 
PPPSBBI together we fight for the nation and the state”. Commonly 
known as jawara pembangunan (development jawara), they worked to 
ensure Golkar’s supremacy. Taking advantage of the long-standing 
influence of jawara in village life, Golkar, through the General Ali 
Murtopo, utilized PPPSBBI to secure support for the party in Banten. 
In addition, as the general chairman of the pendekar28 organization and 
one of the executive committee members of Satkar Ulama, Sochib 
could become a mediator among the military, bureaucracy and Golkar, 
as well as the informal world of Banten.29 
In part due to the close connection of jawara with traditional 
custom, Golkar cadres in general elections that had jawara support 
were guaranteed of victory, for to oppose jawara meant facing the 
powerful magic of the ancestors. Their orders, usually in the form of a 
threat, were always followed by villagers, whom nevertheless had a 
faith in their ability to get things done. Seen in the context of the 
political landscape of the time, the establishment of the PPPSBBI 
coincided with a drive by the New Order to consolidate its power. It 
seems that this is the way they institutionalized troublesome groups 
and subcultures such as jawara. In the name of promoting 
‘development’, PPPSBBI became field agents of the New Order.30 
                                                                 
28 In order to avoid the negative image that had come to be associated with the term 
jawara, it was replaced with ‘pendekar’. See, Wilson, The Politics of Inner Power, p 258. 
However, Tihami who conducted research into jawara in 1992 did not agree with the 
term pendekar, due to the non-originality of the word pendekar in Bantenese languages. 
See the interview with Tihami in Mansur, Profil Haji Tubagus Chasan Sochib, p. 268. 
29 Wilson, The Politics of Inner Power, p. 258. 
30 Ibid., pp. 258-259. 
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Nevertheless, Sochib was not only a jawara and a businessman, but 
he was also a founder of Universitas Sultan Ageng Tirtayasa (Untirta)31, 
Sekolah Tinggi Agama Islam Syekh Mansyur (Staisman), the Banten 
Museum, and the head of the Serang branch of Generation 45. He had 
become powerful in all aspects of Bantenese life; thus many top 
bureaucrats relied on him and his networks as a bridge to the 
Bantenese world.32 
Another prominent jawara figure in Bantenese society is Maman 
Rizal. Like many other jawara, after mastering martial arts, he went to 
Jakarta to gain better chances for his livelihood. In 1967 he began his 
political career by entering Sekber (Sekretaris Bersama/the joint 
secretary) Golkar. In 1970, he joined the MKGR (Musyawarah 
Kekeluargaan Gotong Royong/The Mutual Assistance Families Society), a 
wing organization of Golkar. After returning to Banten, he became a 
member of the Pandeglang branch of Golkar. In Pandeglang he was 
appointed as Ketua Divisi Pemenangan Pemilu dan Pengkaderan (the Head 
of Winning the General Election and Forming of Cadres Division or 
simply the Success Team) of Golkar in 1987-1988. His wide network 
was a basic reason for holding several important positions in Golkar.  
In addition, he also served as the treasurer of MKGR from 1975 
until 1987. His political career in Golkar gradually improved with his 
appointment as treasurer of the Serang branch of Golkar, from 1988-
2000. For Rizal, Golkar had political and economical benefits that 
formed a structural base for broadening his power. As an entrepreneur, 
he has become involved in many government-financed projects. 
Meanwhile, in the jawara world, he is now a leading figure in the 
Kebudayaan Seni Tari dan Silat Indonesia Tjimande Tari Kolot Kebon Djeruk 
Hilir (Kesti TTKKDH-the Indonesian Dancing and Martial Arts 
Tjimande Tari Kolot Kebon Djeruk Hilir Association).33 This 
organization is widely known among the Bantenese, and thus facilitates 
                                                                 
31 Recently, following the formation of Banten as a separated province from West Java 
province, the university was transformed to a state university. 
32 Masaaki, “Local Politics in Decentralised Indonesia”, p. 23; H.S. Suhaedi, Jawara 
Banten: Kajian Sosial-Historis tentang Mobilitas Sosial Jawara (Unpublished M.A. thesis, 
Universitas Indonesia, 2006), p. 135. 
33 This organization is an umbrella organization which covers all Cimande martial arts 
schools and was established in 1952 and claims to have approximately 10 millions 
members all over the country. The number of the members seems very much to be 
exaggerated.  
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spreading the organization to villages. Consequently, Kesti TTKKDH 
contributed to the victories of Golkar in general elections during the 
New Order era. In short, like Sochib, the economical aspect is a main 
reason behind Rizal’s activities.34 
Moreover, Robison demonstrates that one characteristic of 
political power in post-colonial Indonesia was that offices of authority 
within the political parties and the civil and military bureaucracies had 
generally been monopolized by relatively small groups.35 In Banten, 
these relatively small groups were led by jawara. The two examples of 
prominent jawara and their companies show us that jawara to a large 
extent held important roles in colouring the socio-political aspects of 
Bantenese life. Furthermore, despite their dependence on the central 
government, regional governments were relatively powerful in terms of 
local administration because they offered employment and channelled 
government funds. This facilitated the reproduction of patrimonial 
patterns of rule at the local level, especially in Banten. Even though 
jawara as the local elite had access to central state agencies, they also 
relied on local constituencies that were mobilized through ethnic 
loyalties. The Suharto administration offered them the opportunity to 
expand and maintain regional networks of patron-client ties.  
It is interesting to note that Sochib was also involved in Kamar 
Dagang dan Industri (Kadin) and Golkar, whereas Rizal was only in 
Golkar. According to Andrew Macintyre, among the business 
community, Kadin was seen too close to the government. In particular, 
the Kadin leadership was seen as being inappropriately close to Golkar. 
Prominent Kadin figures frequently offered open support and 
endorsement of Golkar and the government.36 Their involvement in 
the ruling party was needed for procuring government contracts. 
Sochib used this to coordinate contracts from the government in the 
Banten area, while Rizal benefited in order to increase his domination 
of power. However, as described earlier, jawara were also notorious for 
                                                                 
34 Suhaedi, Jawara Banten, pp. 137-140. 
35 Richard Robison, “Culture, Politics, and Economy in the Political History of the 
New Order,” in Benedict Anderson and Audrey Kahin (eds). Interpreting Indonesian 
Politics: Thirteen Contributions to the Debate (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project 
Cornell University, 1982), pp. 138-9. 
36 Andrew Macintyre, “State-Society Relations in New Order Indonesia: the Case of 
Business,” in Arief Budiman (ed.), State and Civil Society in Indonesia (Clayton: Monash 
University Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, 1994), pp. 376-377. 
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their involvement in criminal activities; as businessmen with a 
tremendous interest in obtaining access to the resources controlled by 
local government, they made maximum use of their dual status (as 
pure jawara who rely solely on their martial arts ability and as 
businessmen). As businessmen, they maximized their financial 
resources and as jawara they used their resources of force. 
To strengthen their domination of power, jawara also had strong 
control over the press and the institutions of higher learning in Banten. 
Neither was able to play their roles as public watchmen, because to a 
large extent they were either under pressure or benefited from the 
jawara’s activities. To weaken the level of criticism of the press, jawara 
who were actively involved in both local parliament and government, 
and entrepreneurs as well, frequently bestowed the editorial elite with 
government projects, such as research and book publications. Having 
money was also a way to discourage the critical quality of the 
institutions of higher learning. Since they acted both as founders and 
as providers of funds for the institutions, jawara were seen as guardian 
angels, making the institutions’ intellectual element reluctant to criticize 
jawara.  
The roots of the New Order business-military alliance laid in the 
revolutionary period, through military commander Suharto’s financial 
arrangements with Chinese businessmen.37 Furthermore, the major 
indigenous capitalists were not prominent in confronting foreign and 
Chinese capital. Indeed, their emergence under the New Order was 
achieved by integrating them in joint ventures, consortiums, 
distribution and management arrangements. Such integration was built 
upon public legislation which guaranteed the entry of indigenous 
capital into joint ventures and restricted the entry of foreign and 
Chinese capital into specific fields of investment. Consequently, there 
was little incentive for major indigenous capitalists to agitate for 
                                                                 
37 According to Robison, the largest element of the Suharto family’s corporate 
investments was that constituted in equity holdings in the Liem Sioe Liong group. 
Through Sudwikatmono, the Suharto family held five percent of the shares in the Tiga 
Roda cement group, four percent in the Bogasari flour milling company, and at least 
five percent in Waringin Kencana, the trading and rubber milling firm. Sigit 
Harjoyudanto and Siti Hardijanti held thirty two percent of the Bank Central Asia, the 
largest private foreign-exchange bank. Sudwikatmono was also President Director of 
Waringin, Indocement and Bogasari. See, Robison, Indonesia: The Rise of Capital, p. 346. 
To a large degree, however, this information is doubtful, since no one really knows 
about the wealth of Suharto. 
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political power, as a class, when the military ruled so effectively in their 
interest. At the same time there was no reason whatever for the major 
indigenous capitalists to put any real venom into campaigns against 
foreign or Chinese capital, while they were guaranteed a stake in the 
growth of these groups. For instance, there were some close 
connections between William Soerjadjaja (Tjia Kian Liong), a Chinese 
capitalist, and Ibnu Sutowo, Sjarnubi Said and Moh. Joesoef (the last 
two were indigenous entrepreneurs). They were all Soerjadjaja`s 
partners as sole agent of Daihatsu and of Honda motorcycles, in PT 
Inter Astra Motors, as well as in other companies. In addition, Liem 
Sioe Liong, another Chinese capitalist, also developed a broad range of 
partnerships with domestic private and public business groups, 
including the state-owned Krakatau Steel, the Ciputra property 
construction manufacturing group, Sukamdani Sahid`s group, and the 
Suharto family.38 
The same situation also existed in Banten. Sochib worked for a 
Chinese entrepreneur, Tek Wat, in the early 1950s. Tek Wat was a 
merchant who ran a business in agricultural products. When Sochib 
worked for him in 1954, he frequently travelled to Sumatra as Tek 
Wat’s right-hand man. In addition, he also worked for another Chinese 
entrepreneur, Tek Bo. Furthermore, he got an opportunity to 
cooperate with a South Koreans contractor, Lee, who was working in 
Indonesia, building the Jakarta-Merak toll road. He was entrusted with 
being a subcontractor supplying all materials for the project. The 
cooperation was successful. After the project was finished, he was 
granted one unit of Asphalt Mixing Plant (AMP) for minor 
compensation. Up to now, PT Sinar Ciomas Raya is the most fully 
equipped contractor company in Banten.39  
It seems that avoiding confronting foreign and Chinese capital was 
wiser for Sochib than competing with them. Such cooperation indeed 
led Sochib to enjoy success. On the one hand, the New Order created 
a strong base for jawara to enter into a mutually beneficial relationship 
with Golkar and the military power. The jawara leadership, supported 
by the Bantenese cultural structure, were used by the regime to win at 
Banten region. On the other hand, with Golkar endorsements, and the 
close relationship with the armed forces, jawara gained benefits in the 
                                                                 
38 Robison, Indonesia: The Rise of Capital, pp. 292-301 and pp. 363-364. 
39 Suhaedi, Jawara Banten, pp. 82-83 and Mansur, Profil Haji Tubagus Chasan Sochib, p. 95. 
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form of political and economical access as structural base for their 
endeavours.  
In general, jawara used two strategic steps to penetrate the political 
constellation. Firstly, they placed their intellectual cadres in Golkar. 
Secondly, they tried to enforce their cultural influence in Golkar. To a 
large extent the second strategy was successful. Although they were 
not the majority in Golkar, the jawara were able to relatively attained 
their political goals. Through their slogan “Bela Diri, Bela Bangsa, Bela 
Negara” (defend ourselves, defend our nation, defend our country), 
jawara became the foremost opponents of critical groups, such as 
NGOs and students. The involvement of jawara in Golkar as one of 
the most important elements in Banten was a great success for Golkar 
due to their victories in general elections. 
The New Order saw jawara ‘reintegrated’ into the role of a rapidly 
mobilized civilian security force, ready to defend the interests of the 
state. The physical capital possessed by the jawara was a means to 
power. During the New Order, they became a tool of those in power. 
They played a significant role in the manipulative political game playing 
that marked the end of Suharto era, referred to by some as ‘thug 
politics’. One significant difference between the political opportunism 
of jawara in colonial times and the thug politics of the 1990s was the 
degree to which they have been institutionalised by the state.40 
The Integration between Ulama, Jawara and the People 
According to M.A. Tihami, jawara are the pupils of kiai. In Banten, 
Kiai not only teach Islamic religious learning, but also give martial arts 
as one of the lessons. Pupils who are more talented in practising 
martial arts became known as jawara. Even though they graduated 
from pesantren, they still considered the kiai as their teachers. Therefore, 
to oppose the kiai is a serious breach of etiquette, with both social and 
spiritual consequences, and expulsion from pesantren is a serious form 
of social ostracism. On a spiritual level, a rebellious pupil runs the risk 
of kawalat (accursed and therefore struck down by calamity).41 Perhaps 
that is the reason why a considerable number of jawara believe that 
they are the khadam (servant) of kiai.  
                                                                 
40 Wilson, The Politics of Inner Power, pp. 266-267. 
41 M.A. Tihami, Kiai dan Jawara di Banten: Studi tentang Agama, Magi, dan Kepemimpinan di 
Desa Pasanggrahan Serang, Banten (Unpublished M.A. thesis, Universitas Indonesia, 
1992), pp. 99-100; Wilson, The Politics of Inner Power, p. 246. 
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The close relationship between jawara and ulama was crucial 
throughout the late nineteenth century, when revolts against the Dutch 
colonial government erupted throughout Banten, and again during the 
struggle for independence. Both of them were central figures in village. 
The relationship between them was at times troubled, as jawara, to a 
large extent represented pre-Islamic traditions sometimes considered 
to be at odds with Islam.42 Among them, there were also intermediaries 
known as ulama jawara. This term could be applied either to jawara who 
had established themselves as religious teachers, or to ulama who had 
mastered martial arts. In either case such figures played an important 
role as cultural brokers.43 
Moreover, both jawara and ulama jawara in the vast network of 
pesantren were also influential in the spread of martial arts. Perhaps 
martial arts in Banten are closely intertwined with the life of tarekat 
(Islamic brotherhood). In some cases jawara joined tarekat as part of a 
sincere spiritual quest. Nevertheless, commonly, tarekat and the 
techniques that they were taught are means toward obtaining the 
various kinds of esoteric knowledge that are considered essential for 
success as jawara. Similarly, some martial arts teachers conducted 
tarekat type communal devotions. 
According to Hudaeri, jawara played roles mainly with leadership 
aspects, such as becoming jaro (lurah - village head), jagakersa (penjaga 
keamanan desa - village security), martial arts teachers, and teachers of 
magic.44 The jaro figures, who first appeared during the reign of the 
Sultanate, still exist in recent days. Certainly, during the New Order 
era, these figures were well known for their leadership in mobilizing 
local villagers to vote for the ruling party in general elections. Jawara 
also became martial arts teachers as well as teachers of magic. Initially, 
these were the most obvious characteristic possessed by jawara. Within 
jawara culture there was also a differentiation between ‘black magic’ 
and ‘white magic’ jawara. Those who inherited their lineage to past 
jawara and sought to continue it through their own offspring were 
‘white’, whereas those with no identifiable lineage were ‘black’. The 
                                                                 
42 Wilson, The Politics of Inner Power, p. 249. 
43 Sunatra, Integrasi dan Konflik: Kedudukan Politik Ulama-Jawara dalam Budaya Politik 
Lokal: Studi Kasus Kepemimpinan Informal Pedesaan di Banten Selatan (Unpublished Ph.D. 
thesis, Universitas Padjadjaran, 1997), p. 138. 
44 Hudaeri, “Tasbih dan Golok” (Jakarta: The Ministry of Religious Affairs, 2002), p. 
44. 
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existence of a lineage was crucial to the legitimization of a jawara within 
his community. The lineage acted as a type of ‘contract’ of 
accountability to pre-established norms. The linking thread between 
the two types of jawara was the possession of supernatural power. In 
addition, the role of jawara which is associated with magic is as debus 
players. It is interesting to note that many jawara often took some 
verses from Qur’an, and thus they believed that the power they had 
originally came from kiai.45 Nonetheless, to some extent I argue that 
this view is somewhat incorrect since both ‘white’ and ‘black’ jawara 
have used black magic up to the present day. 
Although kinship within jawara culture is not as deeply rooted as 
within that of the ulama, it still has important elements in securing the 
solidarity among them, particularly in the spread of martial arts and 
magic teachings. During the Suharto regime, the kinship showed 
different orientation. They formed ties to further their political 
aspirations. Among these ties, PPPSBBI and TTKKDH were the most 
crucial formally structured organizations.  
Both ulama and jawara are subcultures of the complete culture 
which make up Bantenese culture. Ulama are well known as public 
figures in the socio-religious aspect, while jawara deal mainly with 
society in the social institutions of the Bantenese. Even though ulama 
and jawara played different roles during the New Order era, the 
integration between them through PPPSBBI and Satkar Ulama led 
them to be considered as belonging to the social elite within Bantenese 
society. 
Ulama and jawara are the source of informal traditional leadership, 
particularly in villages. Ulama represent the leadership in knowledge, 
while jawara represent the leadership regards to braveness and physic-
magical power. This kind of leadership cannot be neglected, and in fact 
it can be traced back to the Sultanate period. The long history of 
rebellions in Banten led the Bantenese to possess a unique character 
which mainly characterized by ulama and jawara. Therefore, the 
relationship between ulama and jawara has two special characteristics 
they are the integrative and the disintegrative characteristic.  
In the integrative social relationship, jawara need ulama as religious 
figures as well as for magical power. Ulama are seen as the most 
important legitimizing tool in jawara’s leadership. Without ulama’s 
                                                                 
45 Ibid., pp. 44-53; Wilson, The Politics of Inner Power, p. 245; and Sunatra, Integrasi dan 
Konflik, pp. 100-101. 
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support, jawara may have difficulties in becoming informal leaders. In 
the Bantenese society, which consider religion as guidance, approval 
from ulama will lead the society in choosing the leaders.  
The dependence of Jawara on ulama is in issues of magical sources. 
It is widely believed in Banten that ulama possess ‘Islamic magic’ and 
that jawara gain their fighting skills from ulama. Hence, many jawara 
consider themselves as servants of ulama. On the other hand, ulama 
have several interests in jawara, mainly their physical and material 
support. Jawara who ask for martial arts and magic from ulama will 
surely give material compensation, such as money or valuable gifts, 
which are known as salawat. Giving salawat to ulama is meant as a 
ransoming of ulama’s blessing given to jawara.46 
It can be argued that the unique relationship between ulama and 
jawara obviously occured during the New Order era. According to 
Bourchier, Golkar utilized its affiliated associations, such as the 
Indonesian Renewal Youth Organisation (AMPI-Angkatan Muda 
Pembaharuan Indonesia), National Committee for Indonesian Youth 
(KNPI-Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia) and Siliwangi Youth (AMS-
Angkatan Muda Siliwangi) to secure support for the party (Bourchier, 
1994). In Banten, where local politics was dominated by ulama and 
jawara, they made use of Satkar Ulama47 and PPPSBBI to gain 
victories. In this respect Golkar mirrored the tactics used by the PKI. 
They found out that the feelings of the Bantenese towards ulama were 
those of respect, while towards jawara they were a mixture of fear and 
respect. Therefore, to a large extent the integration between ulama-
jawara and the people could happen due to the support of almost all of 
the elements in Banten who believed in the power of the two social 
groups, and respected them up to recent days, as well.  
Conclusion 
As the important element in Bantenese society, the emergence of 
jawara is still questioned up to this day. However, the background that 
leads to the emergence of jawara can be traced back to the early 
nineteenth century. The changing pattern of the local hierarchy due to 
                                                                 
46 Tihami, Kiai dan Jawara di Banten, p. 103. 
47 For the involvement of Mathla’ul Anwar, one of the largest Muslim mass-based 
organizations in Indonesia, in Golkar, see Didin Nurul Rosidin, From Kampung to Kota: a 
Study of the Transformation of Mathla’ul Anwar 1916-1998 (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 
Leiden University, 2007). 
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the Dutch colonial government in Banten can be seen as the main 
factor in the emergence of the jawara. The attempts done by the Dutch 
to create a centralistic government, and deny noblemen their previous 
position, which was considered higher in society, perhaps explains why 
there were so many resistances to the Dutch in Banten in the 
nineteenth century.  
These resistances are the first stage of the emergence of jawara. 
Together with other elements, jawara fought against colonial 
authorities, as a result of a hostile and aggressive attitude towards both 
the foreigners and the priyayi. It is remarkable to see that even though 
jawara often are seen as a negative social group, their involvement in 
the religious movements marks their ambiguous relationship with the 
rural inhabitants to whom they are both feared and admired. 
The New Order regime under Suharto marked a long period of an 
authoritarian centralistic government where local authorities were 
forced to form patron-client relationships. In fact, under this regime 
the political domination of the state over society extended enormously. 
Even though many scholars believe that the government was 
successful in maintaining macro-economic stability, there were quite a 
few entrepreneurs who enjoyed this era of rapid development. The 
members of the Suharto family, the large Chinese-owned 
conglomerates, and major indigenous business groups were among the 
small number of entrepreneurs who had strong links to high 
government officials and their immediate families, and thus benefited 
from the patron-client relationships. 
In Banten, the establishment of Satkar Ulama and Satkar Pendekar 
(later renamed as PPPSBBI) marked the ties between the state and the 
local society. I would argue that the ties, especially between the state 
and jawara are the most important ties among the patron-client 
relationships in Banten. Jawara were co-opted into the political 
machinery of Golkar, the ruling party. Through Tubagus Chasan 
Sochib, the general chairman of PPPSBBI, jawara could act as bridge 
between the military, bureaucracy and Golkar, where many 
governmental projects came into their possession, since they 
maintained closed patron-client relationships with the rulers. The ties 
lead prominent jawara to become local politicians, as well as 
entrepreneurs. The New Order offered them the opportunity to 
expand and maintain a regional network of patron-client ties. 
  
Yanwar Pribadi 
JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 07, Number 02, December 2013 
334 
Meanwhile, Satkar Ulama and jawara, can also be seen as a 
determining factor in the process of local politics in Banten, where 
their influence went far beyond that of any other elements. The 
integration between ulama-jawara and the people led Golkar to achieve 
victories in Banten. In Banten, ulama and jawara were both respected 
and feared figures because of their physic-magical power, integrated 
they formed a unique combination supporting the New Order regime 
in Banten. This combination was strengthened by the support of local 
society to whom ulama were well-known figures in the socio-religious 
aspect, while jawara were considered by society as a social group within 
the Bantenese culture; thus the integration was able to exist for years, 
even up to the present day. [] 
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